Transcript 0:00 But if you have a full bipolarization of the world, well, that is a fascinating situation for individual commodity markets. But there's one thing China has which you can't teach, you can't teach a country to be enormous. 0:14 [rock music] Dr. Hugh Mackay, former chief economist at BHP, senior international economist at Westpac for many years before that, an advisor inside government, now at the Crawford School at ANU. 0:30 Hugh, he is an incredible intellect at the intersection of geo-economic strategy, where the material base of the modern world, um, is moving. 0:39 His book, The Strategic Logic of China's Economy is, is widely viewed as one of the, the clearest long-range frameworks on, on China's rise, and its, its constraints as well. 0:50 I think, um, I think the Money Miners are gonna get a lot out of this. JD, what did we get into in the convo? Mate, we, we covered heaps. 0:57 For longer term Money Miners out there, they'll know that we had Hugh on in late 2024, and he was so insightful on so many issues, talking to the, the points that you touched upon there. 1:06 So we had to get him back on to hone in on a few specifics. 1:10 We're talking about the RMB, whether that's gonna be the new currency of the world, what that means for gold and this whole debasement trade and inflation, and all those other topics that are often cited we speak about quite a lot. 1:22 Government debt, what that means for the world going forward, be it the US, Australia. The massive win that miners have had in Australia. 1:30 This has been pretty, uh, quietly spoken about, but the massive benefits that have flowed from strong commodity prices as well as a weak Aussie dollar, it's been a real winner. 1:40 And then some of the other topics which he touched upon last time, copper, the bull market we're going through there, Rio Tinto and Glencore, the deal, and a whole heap more. 1:48 And if you're wondering, Money Miners, why Hugh's in his, uh, high vis shirt, he, um, he kindly pulled it out of his, his, uh, his, his drawer. It's from his, uh, a, a time that he visited Escondida, he tells us. 1:58 So, you know, he's got some humor here as well, even though the- there's not too much laughing in the con- in the conversation. Like, he's got- We're talking about real stuff here, mate... he's got a witty side to him. 2:06 [laughs] Before we, before we jump in the conversation, mate, these markets have been super volatile. 2:10 Super, super volatile for anyone involved in the resources game, and I wouldn't blame you if that's making your, your stomach churn a little bit. I love volatility. I don't know about you. 2:18 [laughs] I don't mind it, but for everyone out there, you're at a different stage. You could be a bit more close to retirement and you're thinking, "Hey, my portfolio peeling off 10% in a day is, is not so healthy." 2:29 So you should think about diversifying that portfolio, and you th- should think about the great Australian investment, property. Mate, what could be more Australian than mining stocks and property market? 2:39 [laughs] Nothing, mate. Nothing. And if you're missing property, you sh- should think about Xcede Capital. 2:44 Xcede Capital is a proudly Australian business out of Queensland, and they've got a brand-new property trust that you should check out. It's called the SP Property Trust. 2:52 We're talking about Gold Coast real estate, a very low vacancy market. Their asset has great tenants like Bupa, the Queensland Government, targeting 8% cash returns, monthly distributions paid out. 3:05 Five-year time horizon is, is the goal for this one, so a lot of juicy details in there, and they're all in the show notes if you're keen. I update my thinking. 3:12 What could be more Australian than mining stocks, property, and the Gold Coast? All right, check out Xcede Capital. To Hugh Mackay. Here we go. 3:19 Hugh Mackay, it has been quite some time since we last spoke and, and the world has changed quite a bit since then. It's evolving. Commodity markets are booming. 3:29 China and the US are, are still at kind of loggerheads, so I kind of want to start the conversation right there. 3:34 Xi Jinping made some, some fascinating comments earlier this week about the RMB, their currency, and its, uh, its rising preeminence, and the fact that it should be the global reserve currency. 3:46 I'm curious to hear what you made of these, these remarks, Hugh. Uh, RMB, reserve currency, financial hegemony. Yeah, they're, they're the big questions. Look, um, to... 4:01 I guess one thing that you have to, uh, consider if you want to make a statement like that as, as, uh, the Chinese leader is, does the incumbent currency look vulnerable? Yes. 4:16 Does the US dollar look vulnerable at the moment? Well, the US public debt trajectory certainly looks vulnerable. 4:24 Uh, those people who aren't spending their lives, uh, poring over AI stocks are spending the rest of their time looking at the debasement trade, which is playing out in precious metals and cryptocurrencies. 4:38 And if people are willing to openly talk about a debasement trade of the US dollar, that would imply, in the fullness of time, that the current vehicle currency on which the international system runs, uh, 4:56 may be vacating the throne. Now, I think President Xi is getting well ahead of himself if he thinks the RMB is ready to step directly into that, uh, into that position. 5:10 Uh, there's a lot of things that come with, uh, taking on that international vehicle currency mantle. 5:16 Very few of them, uh, are currently fulfilled, uh, by the Chinese economy, the Chinese political system, the rule of law, governance, liquidity, transaction costs, you know, the list goes on. 5:34 Uh, like for goodness' sake, they haven't even eased capital controls fully yet, so let's not get too far ahead of ourselves. Uh, but there's one thing China has which you can't teach, 5:47 just as you can't teach speed in sporting contests. Someone either has fast-twitch muscles or they don't. You can't teach a country to be enormous. 5:58 Uh, and China is enormousAnd so its, its physical footprint in the global system, particularly in the commodity space, where I think the main game for Beijing initially is to how much, how much of the commodity, uh, trade can we denominate in our home currency, it does have a massive physical footprint in trading goods, 6:23 and particularly trade in resources. That's not a bad start for thinking about these things, but it takes a lot more than that to be the anchor of the international monetary system. So not this decade, not next decade, 6:40 but is the US dollar creating space for someone to make that claim and to pursue it as a superordinate objective for a different society? Perhaps. But yeah, little bit over his skis there, I'd suggest. 6:55 Do, do you think there's, there's a credible case for an RMB or, or gold-based alternative to the USD? Like, if you were to scenario analysis map it out, 7:03 you know, 20 years from now, what's your weighted probabilities of, of the world's reserve currency? Well, there's nothing official about the US dollar's status in the international monetary system. 7:16 It's just the outcome of pure economic gravity and, uh, the way the world order has evolved since World War II. Uh, so no one stood up one day and said, "The US dollar is it." 7:30 Uh, someone did stand up one day and say, "The gold standard is over." Um, that person was Richard Nixon. He went off gold in 1971. 7:40 There was a fixed parity between the US dollar and gold, and there were fixed parities between that price and all the other currencies at the time, and that ushered in the era of fiat currencies. 7:52 And so you have two people, sort of two sets of people coming in on this particular debate. You have libertarian views which find fiat currencies offensive because it means they have to pay tax, 8:09 uh, and they feel that it, uh, it, um, impinges upon their freedom, and therefore they like the whole idea of decentralized finance, uh, blockchain infrastructure, full transparency, and 8:26 most important, finite and fixed supply. Now, a growing global system based on capitalism 8:39 would not thrive under a monetary system which focused on finite and fixed supply. You know why? Because we want to grow, and the second you grow, 8:56 you create demand for more money. But if you're not gonna create any more money, the next step is that the price of goods and services 9:10 in the money you've chosen, which can't grow in supply, is gonna go down. There's a word for that. It's called deflation. Deflation is horrible, and it's particularly horrible if you have accrued debts in the past. 9:29 Part of the logic for accruing those debts in the past is that growth in the underlying system in a nominal sense was going to pay some of that debt off for you. But if you've accrued all this debt, and then 9:44 prices start to move backwards, that is horrible. And one of the most powerful theories of, uh, depressions is actually called the debt deflation hypothesis, which was sort of an empirical, uh, 10:02 an empirical piece of work studying how the Great Depression from the 1930s happened, and there was a gold standard at the time, of course. And, um, yeah, I think people don't realize how 10:18 toxic for the global capitalist system, which is built on the creation of credit and people taking risk and accruing debt liabilities, uh, to back those risks, 10:31 how toxic moving to a crypto basis would be, or a physical basis like gold. Should governments run their, uh, balance sheets more, in a more disciplined fashion? Yes, of course they should. Uh, 10:49 but I, I do feel though that, uh, the, what would be called the fiscal hawks in macroeconomic terms, hawkish as in they don't like debt, uh, doves being people who are more relaxed about it, I'd certainly put myself more in the, the dovish camp in terms of what level of government debt is sustainable, 11:09 uh, in the global system. And why I think bigger levels of debt are sustainable than, uh, what a hawk might suggest, it's two things. Um, one, 11:24 the government footprint in contemporary societies is much, much bigger than it was, say, a hundred years ago. Governments used to be a very, very small part of the economy. 11:38 Uh, they're now very big parts, let's say thirty-five to fifty-five percent in a wealthy country in terms of how much income is filtered through their balance sheets, uh, on a regular basis. And 11:50 to say that, uh, someone has that much income washing through their balance sheet can't service, um, debt, which is, uh, 12:01 say, twice the size of their annual income-Well, that just seems like, uh, ridiculously conservative when you consider, for example, um, households take out mortgages all the time, which are six, seven, eight times their annual income, 12:18 and as an individual taking out a mortgage, I don't have the ability to legislate to raise taxes and increase my income. So I think people are a little bit too, uh, a little bit too, um, hawkish about that. 12:33 But the other thing, 12:36 and this, this sort of goes to how precious metals trade and how quickly they can go to valuations which sort of have no sort of connection to how much it physically costs to develop a gold mine or to develop a silver mine, et cetera. 12:52 Um, the stock of financial assets or the stock of financial wealth in the global system is so monumentally large now. Uh, something has to carry that on the liability side of the balance sheet. 13:09 And financial wealth in the global system is six or seven or eight times world GDP. World GDP is around one hundred trillion dollars. So let's take that seven percent multiple there and say there's 13:25 seven hundred trillion dollars of financial wealth looking for a home. Uh, how much public debt can you sustain under that situation? Should a quarter of that be held in government debt? Should a fifth be held in it? 13:41 Should a third be held in it? Like, the exact number doesn't really matter, but the scaling up of government debt isn't outlandish relative to the scaling up of financial wealth in the global system. 13:59 A tricky aspect of this, though, is that a lot of that, um, government debt was, uh, accrued when interest rates were lower than they are now, 14:09 and one of the reasons why interest rates are going up is because there is more inflation premium which is built into the price of those bonds than there was in the past, 14:21 and that is going to be a tricky transitional period. Doesn't mean that the US dollar is no longer the incumbent, uh, as the vehicle currency for the system, but it does mean that governments need to start, 14:35 um, being a bit more realistic about their spending trajectories, uh, and in some cases, more realistic about their revenue raising. Anglo sphere economies like the US, Australia, UK, Canada, um, 14:52 they can probably think about their revenue si- revenue side of things as well as spending. Europeans, I think they've already got as much revenue as they can possibly get. 15:01 They need to start thinking about their spending. You, you mentioned the phrase that government's being realistic about their spending. 15:07 I think the, the debasement trade is, uh, um, is really the result of the financial world, investors being realistic about government's lack of propensity to control their spending. There's, um... 15:21 Yeah, but I do find that interesting that y- you talk about the potential of two times, two times GDP, but not being obscene, whereas conventional wisdom is, is when you're north of a hundred and twenty percent of GDP, it's, um, it kind of all ends in, in a few ways, and they're all dire for, for countries and empires. 15:38 Well, yeah, the... This is one of those areas where, um, you can focus on the flows which come with servicing a stock of debt, i.e., how much of my income is going to servicing my debt, uh, out of my current income, 15:53 or you can focus on the level, uh, and say, "Okay, well, that level just looks crazy. Let's, let's do something about this." Um, the vast majority of analysis you will see is related to those flows, 16:07 and the, the big metric a lot of people like to talk about is how much does the government spend servicing their debt versus spending on their military or spending on their healthcare system or spending on, uh, 16:21 education, all these core functions of government. And the one that, uh, often comes up in great power situations is the military spending. And, um, Ray Dalio, the hedge fund manager, has done some, 16:37 um, historical studies, and he thinks that metric's really important. And look, it's a, it's a genuine, uh, sort of sticker shock moment when you say something like that. Uh, and so yeah, I think, um, it does make sense. 16:52 But I was-- remember being on a call, um, with the former, uh, with a former senior politician, not a, not a, not in Australia, and they were talking about, you know, the politics of fiscal adjustment. 17:11 And they say, "Look, if you've got a, if you've got a billion dollar problem, then you can think about sort of trimming, trimming your budget for a billion dollars, and you can probably find that somewhere. 17:26 But if your problem is a hundred billion dollars or two hundred billion dollars, there's nothing which is gonna get you through that without 17:35 fierce and vicious political opposition from the groups which are having something taken away from them." 17:42 And so the political calculus is that it just becomes too hard, and any country which has gone past that threshold where all of their fiscal problems have those huge numbers attached to them, and so it actually means something dramatic is gonna happen, and I'm gonna be taking a lot of things away from this segment of my society, 18:00 and possibly not giving it to anybody else, so I don't even have a consistuence-- constituency to say, "Yes, we should do that," uh, to offset the people saying, "Don't ever do that," then you've got a problem.Uh, and that is, um, 18:15 that's the position you don't want to get to, and some European countries reached that point a long time ago. Um, the UK is getting close to there now. Um, not sure we're there in Australia. 18:33 I think Australia's fiscal position is still very strong relative to most other advanced countries. Uh, but in Australia, 'cause we're, we're also spending a lot of money, uh, in a recurring sense, 18:49 and what is financing that on the revenue side of the balance sheet has a heavy cyclical component to it, which is this commodity boom that we're living through. 18:59 Uh, and we're living through it at a time when the Australian dollar isn't very high, which is just, um, making the management of mining companies, uh, in a country like ours, uh, look, uh, look pretty special. 19:13 Uh, but there's a little bit of fairy dust sprinkled on it, which is this massive disconnect between the level of commodity prices and the level of the Australian dollar. 19:21 And I wrote something on this in the Financial Review this week actually, and, um, you can... If you're interested in those technical details. But, uh, 19:30 yeah, that has created a huge, um, revenue boost to governments in Australia, and that means you can, you can spend a lot more today without it showing up as a dreadful deficit position. Uh, 19:47 but when the cycle turns, it will, it will look quite, quite stark. And one of the points you, you kind of allude to in that article is that that, that has got to change. 19:57 In, in simple terms, for those that haven't read it, you're saying we have great commodity prices here and an unusually weak, uh, foreign exchange position, exchange rate, given where the commodity prices are. 20:11 So is it your expectation that, that that closes, the Aussie dollar gets stronger if the commodity price, prices continue to, to hold up over the next one, two, three, four years? Hmm. 20:24 This is the kind of thing you actually... is best looked at sort of in a two-by-two matrix setting, uh, to sort of look at the combinations of adjustment profiles. Uh, 20:37 the reason why I can't sort of be sort of adamant on the answer to this question is one of the reasons we got here is because some correlations that were historically reliable broke down, 20:51 and this pandemic decade, a lot of correlations which used to be reliable did break down temporarily. 20:58 And you get in a situation, you say, "Okay, well, are we just gonna go back to that world which the, where the correlations were reliable, or are they gonna stay broken? Is a new correlation gonna assert itself?" Um, 21:14 but what we've got in the Australian context is Australian interest rates have been below US interest rates for most of the decade. That's an historically abnormal situation. 21:29 Typically, the US has lower interest rates than Australia, but the Reserve Bank of Australia has set interest rates below the level that the US Federal Reserve has chosen at the cash rate level, overnight rate. 21:42 Normally, that happens in a crisis, like in the Asian crisis, but to have that combination of relative interest rates with the US at the same time we've got a commodity boom is really weird, and 21:59 I think there are reasonable indications that after the February rate hike of the Reserve Bank of Australia, which has pushed Australia above the US for the first time in more than sixty months, um, 22:15 and the US has got a lot of, uh, political pressure on the Fed there, um, it's likely that we're not gonna go back to that negative territory, and that should show up in a firmer Australian dollar on average. 22:28 But the gap is so big that any closure is likely to be unfavorable for resource profitability, government revenues, mining equity. 22:47 So let's just run through a couple of those scenarios. Let's say the currency stays where it is and commodity prices fall to where the currency sort of says they should be. 22:57 Okay, well, that's sort of stable US dollar costs from an FX point of view, but revenues go down because the base commodity price goes down. Not good news, but it's a part of the cycle, right? 23:09 The other one is that the Australian dollar jumps up to the level that the commodity prices say it should be, and commodity prices stay where they are. 23:16 Well, that's bad news on the cost side of the balance sheet because your US dollar costs are gonna go through the roof 23:24 because your Australian dollar wage bill is going through the roof, but you haven't got any offset on the revenue side. So that's bad news as well. Uh, or you meet somewhere in the middle, 23:35 but that's two bad things happening. Commodity price is down, Australian dollar up. So most of the, most of the exit routes from this disconnect don't look good. What I think we can hope for 23:54 is a very protracted adjustment process, and when I say protracted, I mean over a decade or so, where you get this directional shift, but it happens slowly enough that you don't really recognize it in the moment. 24:11 So you do close that gap, but it's just a drift, 24:17 and then it would be less disruptive.Anyone who's spent a long time around the mining industry or financial markets understand that things don't just drift and, uh, adjust over 10 years. They usually, once 24:30 sentiment turns for whatever reason, it's, uh, it's either a sprint for the exit or a sprint to get on the bandwagon. And, uh, I'll leave it there. 24:41 Animal spirits or FOMO, whatever you describe it, things do happen all at once, in fact. Yeah. 24:48 I'm, I'm reminded of, of, um, I think, of, of us talking last time here about a phenomenon where things can happen all at once, and we're talking about specific commodity prices just going, um, yeah, p- parabolic all at once, and we described that phenomenon in iron ore and, and you described the circumstances that, that led you to come to the conclusion that, you know, it's very capable of that happening in copper as well. 25:12 Um, is that happening in copper right now, or are we still too early? Uh, well, the answer to that can be yes and no because the... Nothing has occurred since we last spoke, let's say roughly 12 months ago, which 25:31 has made the s- the structure, structural bull case for copper any less strong. Uh, financial markets, of course, they want to try and price in 20 years of good news immediately, 25:48 and here we are, $13,000 copper. Uh, so the financial markets want to monetize today, and they do, but they find that these rallies, um, 26:04 they're very difficult to sustain because there is no sort of producer-consumer element to the kicker-in price. Uh, if it's just a bunch of hedge funds trading with each other 26:20 or trading desks at big banks, you know, uh, then it's gonna be finite because they always need new buyers to enter into the market to sustain what they've got. 26:33 And if the real, the real economy part, i.e., the copper miners, copper smelters, uh, copper consumers aren't participating, it's always gonna burn itself out. We had a mini example of this, uh, 26:49 oh, when, when, when data centers first became a thing in terms of, uh, people talking about it, a whole bunch of, uh, US hedge funds 27:03 ramped the COMEX copper price because of this AI leverage theme. 'Cause when you have something as sort of, uh, as powerful as the AI investor theme, there's the direct linkage 27:20 and then there is this scouring of the whole investment universe to find things which are roughly adjacent to that and have some kind of leverage but may not have been discovered yet. And copper and data centers 27:36 was that. So everybody jumped on that trade really quickly, and then someone inconveniently introduced some facts. It might have been me, maybe not, I can't confirm or deny. 27:50 But someone might have said that, "You realize this is 1% of copper demand, don't you?" And they said, "Oh, okay. Well, um, hmm. [chuckles] That's not very much, is it?" And I say, "No, it's not very much." Uh, 28:05 but copper was a good buy at the time. Um, the, the best short-term trade in copper over the last little while, um, was in January 2025. Uh, 28:23 this was during the, uh, period between Trump being elected and Inauguration Day. So he told everybody very transparently he was slapping tariffs on everything. Now, the way tariffs work in a commodity market 28:41 is that it should show up immediately in regional premium. But in January, you looked at the forward curve for COMEX in the US over LME in the UK, 29:00 nothing. So I, I wrote a blog at the time, uh, on my Substack called Commodities and Tariffs: Smoke but No Fire. And suddenly, uh, 29:14 Liberation Day and all those sorts of things, and everyone said, "Oh, hang on a minute. Copper in the US, um, if I've actually got it sitting in London, I can just move it to the US and it's gonna be 50% more valuable. 29:31 You're kidding me." And yes is the answer. [chuckles] And so you had this massive, massive physical trade, which was the easiest money I've ever seen sitting out there in commodity markets. 29:45 But if you looked at the forward curve a day or two before Inauguration Day, there was nothing there. Just goes to show how inefficient these commodity markets can be. 29:55 And when you think about how inefficient they are and what can happen when a weight of sort of, uh, non-specialized money comes into a market, like the silver market recently, 30:11 um, basically trading a ratio, uh, to another metal about which they don't know very much, uh, yeah, it's a recipe for immense price volatility. 30:24 Um, part of this is the fact that the producers don't spend much time in those markets anymore.You, you wrote an article recently, Hugh, as well tacking onto the, the copper theme there and that sort of story about Rio Tinto and, and Glencore and the, the proposed deal and perhaps some, some interest from BHB. 30:45 I'm curious to, to hone in, as well as the copper, the, the trading desk part of, of Glencore's business. This is 30:53 a, you know, a fascinating and controversial part of their, their business and heaps of different analysts have different opinions. 30:59 They're gonna cast it off or it's gonna be an integral kind of part of their business in a, a more uncertain world. How do you kind of think about the strategic importance of that desk? Yeah, look, it's, uh, 31:15 it's probably one of the most difficult aspects of anyone thinking about merging with Glencore. How do they think about putting a value on that business? 31:25 And there are lots of businesses which fit very nicely within the corporate finance box. Commodity trading businesses are not one of them. Things that do fit nicely in the box are relatively low volatility 31:44 and have some kind of, uh, stable relationship to slow-moving variables like GDP, you know, that sort of stuff. Um, the commodity trading businesses, um, 32:03 they can be pretty, uh, underwhelming for years and years at a time, and then you run into a year where the head of the desk at, uh, the commodity desk at Macquarie Bank, you know, makes twice as much as the CEO. 32:19 That's the way they go. But if you don't know when that year is gonna arrive, how do you value it? Because if it's in year 10, your discounting means that's kind of irrelevant. If it's in year two, 32:33 I can almost pay whatever I want for this business and it's gonna be a good idea. And so that... Businesses which have, uh, that right-hand tail, uh, aspect to them, i.e. 32:49 when they have a big year, they have a really big year. But they can also have some pretty big drawdowns if they get on the wrong side of something. Um, you know, they're, they're very difficult to fit into that box. 33:04 Very easy to, uh, value, uh, Rio Tinto's iron ore business if you've got a decent price deck. Uh, very, very difficult to value Glencore's trading business. 33:17 But what would it give you as a diversified resources company that you don't currently have? It would give you some insurance against market access uncertainty, 33:35 and this is really big. When a sophisticated, uh, company looks at, uh, looks at sort of the scenario landscape today, 33:51 situations where market access get impaired by geopolitics are everywhere in these scenarios. So under those circumstances, uh, you can see very clearly how having that 34:09 physical commodity trading business, storage optionality, uh, becomes p- potentially very valuable, particularly if your, if your own storage as a diversified resources company now is very modest. 34:28 So for example, if you think about BHP's iron ore business, they have very little ability to store product onshore at Port Hedland. Very, very difficult. There's nothing. There's no space, right? And so 34:46 to get the throughput you need, that incredible logistics chain needs to keep moving and keep moving continuously. 34:58 But what about if you had some land optionality somewhere in the Asian region in a neutral country where 35:10 if you lost access to a market for a partic- particular period of time, you knew where that product was gonna go and sit, and you were gonna ride it out. You weren't gonna impinge your operation 35:24 to keep the throughput going, but you had somewhere to put that, and that was part of your marketing strategy all along. You know, that would be valuable, right? Uh, and if you're in another business, if you, um, 35:39 where, where that land optionality, uh, could help you, you know, why not? With metallurgical coal, of course, which, um, was directly impacted by the, 35:54 let's call it a trade war between China and Australia, uh, where we lost access to Chinese coal markets for a period of time. You know, it's not great to store a whole lot of coal, uh, somewhere either. 36:08 But if you'd actually had a physical trading business which was built to sort of wrestle with those kind of problems, um, then you could see how that might help you. 36:20 Uh- This feels like a pertinent hypothetical, just given the nature of, of heightened tensions between Ch- China and CMRG and, and BHP right now. Uh, look, I, I wouldn't overemphasize that particular angle. Uh, 36:36 what, what I-But we have seen circumstances where, for whatever reason, um, access to a market has been informally closed. Um, 36:53 or we've actually had export controls in the other direction. So both of these are geoeconomic tools. Uh, China has done it with rare earths in the past in terms of export controls. 37:05 They've done it stopping things at the border in terms of Australian coal. Um, so even if you have zero imagination, you don't have to imagine this. It's already happened. 37:18 Uh, and so building it in, I think, in terms of what you would, what you would think about the optionality that a physical trading business brings you. Now, can you build that yourself internally? Maybe. 37:35 But there's benefits of incumbency if you've already got this sort of physical storage stuff going on. So I'm not talking here about, you know, people taking massive paper positions in commodities. 37:46 I'm talking about the optionality of controlling your own destiny in terms of the physical trade and riding out difficult periods. Now, there's another aspect to this which actually points in the other direction. 38:00 So you can trade as much as you want with a rival. You cannot trade at all with your enemy. Once someone flips from one category to the other, 38:14 or you can trade as much as you want with someone who, you know, has, uh, kind of a little bit of a shady reputation, 38:22 but if they're physically under sanction, like formally under sanction, you can't trade with them at all. Now, commodity trading companies, I'm sorry to tell you, and this will shock your listeners, um, bust sanctions. 38:39 We won't be shocked to hear that. [laughs] And, uh, some of the anecdotes in a book like The World for Sale, uh, about- Totally... where some of this stuff plays, like, it's, it's messy stuff. 38:57 And if you're in a situation where, uh, the enforcement of things like, uh, sanctions busting or accommodating trade flows between, 39:14 you know, three parties to get the stuff to where it needs to go eventually, if someone just starts enforcing that really carefully, um, some of those really big years, those right-hand tail years 39:28 in the history of the trading companies, it might look a little bit different. So the way, for example, um, the US military has been pursuing sanctioned tankers in the Caribbean, 39:45 uh, in the wake of Venezuela, for instance. 39:49 Um, but there are mixed signals here, of course, as well, because, uh, Trump has also indicated that, uh, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the United States is actually disadvantaging US companies. So, 40:01 uh, the authorities should just start looking the other way on that particular act in terms of emerging markets. So, like, who knows? But, um, there's also that aspect of things. And, um, Glencore 40:18 has settled with the Department of Justice on one or two things. I think there's, there's still some stuff sitting out there, one assumes. Um, yeah, and that's a very big reputational risk to carry. 40:31 Uh, but it is par for the course for those, those trading companies. They have very high appetite for risk. Uh, and yeah. 40:47 And a really prosaic point, cost of capital. So working capital in diversified mining companies, that particular line on the spreadsheet gets shaved and shaved and shaved and shaved and shaved. 41:02 You know, that's what CFOs do on a day-to-day basis. "How can I get my working capital down?" And that was when interest rates were essentially zero. Imagine what they're like now 41:12 in terms of how much they begrudge that working capital. Physical trading businesses are capital hungry, working capital hungry. And when short-term capital for working purposes is more expensive, 41:31 that puts a greater onus on the trading business to make more money to justify the capital, which tends to give them more risk appetite. But will their limits go up? 41:46 So does that mean that they have to be pushed into higher risk, higher returning, uh, activity? So, like, it's, it's not simple at all. And, um, one of the things I sort of... 42:02 Well, actually, the thing I finished that article on about looking at the, looking at this potential tie-up in a hypothetical sense is both of the big two are preaching simplicity. Yeah. 42:15 Well, that era is over if either of you merge with Glencore. Complexity. You've swapped scale for simplicity. Uh, you've chosen complexity. The payoff is scale. 42:29 The payoff is copper.But simplicity has to be lost. It, it makes it so amazing to me that, like, we... 42:38 It seems like we all agree that, that the value of Glencore's trading business, in many respects, would've been maximized if it was... 42:46 If it w- like, you know, spun off or was, was, was privatized and contracts remained, et cetera, to allow it to happen. 42:52 And that way you can kind of keep the talent, keep the people, keep the, the opaqueness where commodity trading businesses can, can thrive and maybe even get maximum value for it as, as well in the process. 43:02 But, but what seems to be forefront is, is a deal where, where the whole of Glencore is, is swallowed whole of Glencore. Well, I don't know about a spinoff in commodity trading. Um, I think a spinoff of a coal business, 43:19 possibly US domiciled, makes a lot of sense. But Glencore, yes, it has a very, very unique structure with the trading business. It is a formidable industrial company as well. It's good at mining. Oh. 43:36 It's actually quite good at downstream as well, even though, like many mining companies, it doesn't like the return on capital from its, uh, downstream assets. 43:43 The metals business has, has been pretty ordinary from a, yeah, an operational capability in recent years. Well, but if you just look at, if you look at the history, um, their performance to guidance is very different 43:57 to the other companies. Why is that? Well, part of it is the, uh, the way that, uh, Glencore seeks to eke value 44:09 out of assets which probably aren't high quality enough to make it into the capital allocation processes of a Rio Tinto or a BHP. And what makes Glencore unique is they can take a third or fourth quartile copper asset 44:28 and understand in their own minds that they can boost the IRR on that through their marketing activities, and one of the ways you can do that is by being quick to shutter that operation during the down cycle and 44:47 be positioned to take advantage of the announcement effect that they're shutting copper production. So there, there are some, there are some synergies between controlling the operations yourself, having the equity tons, 45:02 and running the trading business. I think the trading business would be far less valuable without the industrial backend. 45:12 And surely transferring all the, the pricing to your, your Swiss headquarters helps, which they do in just about every jurisdiction that they operate. Well, you guys are bankers. You'd know more about that than me. 45:23 [laughs] Uh, but, um- We'll put that to the side. [laughs] I reckon the economist knows- Yeah. I reckon the economist knows more about transfer pricing. 45:29 [laughs] You should do a whole podcast on, uh, transfer pricing, and I will not listen. [laughs] But, um, the, the, that, that aspect of things, um, is very important. 45:42 If you just go standalone, I'm a commodity trading company, uh- Yeah... when you don't have that sort of baseline revenue there, uh, coming from the industrial business, I think you'd be far less formidable. 45:58 Now, it's different if you're an energy trader, but the scale of the value chains in energy are so much larger than the value chains in metals. Yeah. So the, you know, the... 46:12 If you're an oil market trader, you're, you're playing in a, depending on the oil price, let's say $2.5 trillion to $3.5 trillion value chain. There's more than enough for everybody embedded, embedded in there. Yeah. 46:27 You know, the biggest value chains in metals are not that large. Um, particularly some of the commodities in which Glencore operates. And to think that you would be a, a business of sufficient global scale 46:44 by playing in these sort of backwater markets as a standalone, yeah, I'm not sure that that's a particularly compelling, uh, compelling way of thinking about things. 46:58 There's something that occurs to me actually, 'cause energy came up there. I did like the way that, uh, Shell, uh, the, the major oil company, talked about their trading franchise. 47:11 So they've actually gone out to investors and they've put an IRR uplift number to, um, to their upstream businesses, uh, through their trading activities. 47:28 Can't remember the exact number. It might be one to two percentage points of IRR based on the quality of the trading business. 47:37 And if you know anything about Shell and its global operations, uh, and its position in the LNG market, um, you can see why people take that claim seriously- Yeah... uh, when they put it in the investor deck. Totally. 47:51 But also by putting that IRR number on it and saying one to two, it works better in the shoebox of corporate valuation. Totally. 48:04 You, you made the point earlier that I really wanna touch on, Hugh, of the, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the, the, the US and, and all of this. 48:13 And what we saw, uh, the night before last was really interesting with in the lead-up to a proposed Glencore, Rio Tinto deal, Glencore selling a 40... 48:24 Proposing to sell a 40% stake of their DRC copper assets, which would to many people were a huge sticking point in a deal, 48:33 to a US government-backed deal with the, uh, deputy secretary of, of the s- of state-Having a, a comment right at the top of that kind of list. Mm. 48:44 That, that seems like a pretty interesting point and something I suspect we'll see more of in the, um, the evolving geopolitical landscape. Is, is that something you kind of picked up on? Yeah. I, I did see that. Um, 49:01 yeah, the, the town of Kolwezi, uh, conjures up many things for me, uh, in the, in the DRC. 49:10 Um, so yes, does this help in terms of the broader relationship with the US government and any potential, uh, questions antitrust authorities in the US might have about this deal? Is that a useful thing to do? 49:26 Yeah, I think so, particularly if you get a good price. Because one of the things which, uh, uh, companies should like about sovereign participation like this is 49:40 how well advised is the sovereign going to be once they've announced they're gonna do something, and do you get some free money by the sovereign actually paying too much, uh, for, for an asset like this one. Um, 49:54 yeah, I, I don't think it does away with the broader reputational question around what kind of a company is Glencore, what kind of a company is Rio Tinto, uh, how do those two cultures blend, what's actually sitting out there in terms of unquite- unquantifiable legal liability if something hasn't been found yet and it might be found later, who knows. 50:18 Um, but I think it opens up an interesting question about in this tie-up, competition authorities around the world would be looking at this and 50:34 thinking, "Well, what's my pound of flesh for putting this one through?" That's- Now-... that's so interesting... the reason that, uh, China actually owns the Los Bambas, uh, mine in South America- Pound of flesh... 50:51 is the Chinese competition authorities extracted their pound of flesh from the original merger, Glencore Xstrata. 50:57 There's, there's a pound of flesh in the latest, uh, es- SQM approval, uh, with, with, um, uh, the, the SQM Codelco deal from the Chinese, um- Yeah... yeah, competition approval as well. Yeah. 51:11 And so what would be an attractive asset for, you know, the competition authorities to leverage, you know? Like it's, uh, um... I would suspect that, uh, potentially, uh, 51:25 a Chinese entity might be more interested in that asset that, uh, [laughs] that the US have just bought into and might have a better, better sense of, uh, extracting value from it. 51:35 But of course Kolwezi is on the Lobito corridor. Now, your listeners don't, maybe haven't all heard that term, but one of the problems with Central African copper 51:48 is it's essentially stranded from a logistics point of view. 51:53 And copper from the southeast corner of the DRC, the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is smack bang in the middle of that continent, and Zambia to the south, it's traditionally... 52:07 They've needed to actually turn it into refined copper to move it, and it moves on trucks through some pretty dangerous territory all the way down to the east coast of South Africa, uh, Durban, uh, in Natal. Um, 52:26 and more recently because Zimbabwe has become so dangerous and the security costs for escorting those convoys of copper has become so onerous, they've actually had to go all the way around to Botswana to get some safer roads and then make their way east. 52:43 So this is, this is horrendous in terms of the logistics. You know, you think MinRes and their, their road in Western Australia is less efficient than proper rail, like on the resource... 52:54 You know, it's got nothing on trying to, [laughs] trying to get copper out of the middle of Africa. But the Lobito corridor is this, um, sort of a G7 sort of, 53:06 uh, idea to get a rail corridor from Kolwezi in the DRC going west to exit out of Angola, 53:18 uh, and actually provide, um, an alternative infrastructure route to mobilize that very, very resource rich corner of the world. Chinese of course, uh, like to build a lot of infrastructure. 53:35 Uh, they built a lot in Africa and they also own the eastern rail route from that area which goes out, uh, through Tanzania into Dar es Salaam. Uh, 53:49 but Kolwezi specifically, another thing that, uh, China is doing in that part of the world is they've established a huge training institute for local engineers, and, uh, 54:06 I call this the, uh, the, the Tsinghua alumni reunion. So Tsinghua is the top engineering school in, uh, in China, uh, sort of China's MIT is how it's usually described in the Western press. 54:20 Now, the world's best steel analyst who worked for me when I was at BHP was a Tsinghua engineering grad, so I always used to ask him where all his alumni are working now. 54:32 Now in the late 2010s he said, "Oh, they're all in Pakistan. 54:38 Most of them are building water treatment plants in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road."But you fast forward five years, I said, "Oh, what, what's happening with your, with your old mates from Tsinghua?" 54:49 And he said, "Oh, they're all in Kolwezi." And that, it's actually not a bad lifestyle, uh, versus some of the alternatives. 55:00 Working in a huge R&D lab for a BYD in China and not earning much, but also having to live in the Chinese surveillance state. 55:11 You go and you have a bit of fun in, uh, Africa, and you do something cool, and you see the world, and yeah, it's not a bad gig. Uh, yeah. But, uh, 55:22 it's a, it's, uh, becoming a more hotly contested area of the world, obviously. And if the Libido Corridor does what it's intended to do, it also changes the economics of Central African copper projects significantly. 55:38 And they may end up being able to just produce concentrates rather than having to build the expensive downstream processing. And that makes a big difference when you're China, and you've been 55:53 in this breakneck speed build-out of your own smelting capacity, um, to run down your copper cathode import requirement over time, and that's why treatment charges in copper are so, 56:06 uh, horrendously low from a smelter's point of view, but best days ever from a copper concentrate, uh, producer's point of view. 56:15 But that would change things a lot, uh, if the Central African stuff started to exit as concentrate rather than refined. 56:21 Do, do you think the, the local countries would just force them to, to do the downstream, or do you think China has, you know, far in excess of the muscle needed to, to get their way? Uh, 56:35 I, I think there would be a probably a desire to, um, to have the downstream processing. 56:42 But if you've got the infrastructure in place and the companies were able to explain the differential economics and actually say, "Well, the pie, the profitable pie that we can all share, 56:56 uh, will be much larger if we don't spend a few billion dollars paying a Chinese en- engineering company to build a smelter. We can use that $2 billion for other things. Do you have any ideas about what that might be?" 57:12 Uh, and that reminds me of another anecdote from that part of the world where the Sicomines project, uh, in the DRC, 57:23 every time the regime changed hands, this project had to get renegotiated with the new owners, or new owners of the country, like. And, uh, they just kept extracting more and more and more civilian infrastructure, 57:36 uh, to keep the, keep the mining license. And I was looking at this and thinking, "Gee, this is... See, they're really folding pretty quickly on the civilian infrastructure. Why are they not negotiating so hard?" 57:48 Then I act- [laughs] Then I realized that the owner of this copper mine was actually an engineering infrastructure company, and they were, they wanted into the DRC for the infrastructure contracts anyway. 57:58 And they just owned this copper mine because that was kind of their point of entry. And yeah, sometimes, uh, you uncover strange things when you dig a little bit below the surface. Yeah. That's right. 58:13 So it's not necessarily... If you, if you tell someone, um, there are hundreds of millions of dollars or billions of dollars that we could save and use for something else if we don't go downstream with the smelter, 58:27 uh, and you talk about what to do with that, you know, you've got a chance of a fair hearing. We- I've got, I've got some questions, Hugh, that, um, 58:38 are a bit hypothetical in, in nature, but I feel like these are the sorts of questions that y- you ponder that, you know, ma- major, major political groups ponder, that the major miners who operate and are walking a fine line ponder as well. 58:53 What would or should Australia do if China moves on Taiwan? [laughs] Well, look, um, I think, uh, ultimately 59:10 the alliance with the United States is the pillar of Australia's national security. So, uh, you have to, 59:26 uh, be very conscious of that before you say anything publicly, uh, on, on such a matter. Maybe I should rephrase it. What, what could even trigger Australia to decouple from the US? You know, where is our red line? 59:39 Uh, look, um, I wouldn't be setting up a set of signposts for that. Um, the best way to tackle questions like this is by devising widely divergent potential scenarios. 1:00:00 Investigate them, understand what you might do if I ended up following your specific chain of logic to a conclusion, or the opposite happened, and I follow that to a conclusion, 1:00:17 and you understand all of the... You, you try to understand the whole landscape. And then you say, "Are there any no-regret decisions I could take under these circumstances, uh, which, 1:00:29 which would set me up well for the future?" And then you step into the judgment calls. Um, so I'm, I'm relatively attracted to the Echidna strategy position on The Future of Australia's Defense, book by Sam Roggeveen. 1:00:48 Uh, recommend that you take a look at it. 1:00:51 Um-I've always thought Hugh White's views on the security balance, uh, between Australia, China, and the United States, and other major players in the region such as Japan are always worth reading also. 1:01:12 Um, and finally there, the most important assumption in one of these big scenario analyses I'm talking about, it's got nothing to do with China and Taiwan. I call it the year five assumption, 1:01:31 as in year five of Trump 2.0. [laughs] What happens in the next round of US politics, and that's where you actually take your jumping off point for, uh, 1:01:49 what does the long run future look like? If the US continues down this path of populism, the US alone, uh, sort of a bullying hegemon, then you think about acting in one way. If 1:02:07 you have Democrats, uh, running the White House and, uh, a stronger position in Congress, and you end up with a more like a, a Biden-type administration, well, you start to think about things very differently. 1:02:21 And you have to consider the opposite of what feels most concrete today to do a good job at long-term forecasting. When I started my career, 1:02:36 a couple of things which were held as completely true and you just should not argue about them is that the US would be alone at the top of the superpower tree for the twenty-first century. Okay, well, that's not true. 1:02:53 Um, it was the new economy, as they called it at the time, you know, 'cause the invention of the Internet was still fresh in people's minds, and there was a tech bubble going on in the United States. 1:03:03 They said, "Oh, the old economy. Oh, you don't want to be old economy." And who are the best performed economies of the, uh, first quarter of the twenty-first century? 1:03:15 Well, Australia was the best performing advanced con- economy, arguably. Why? Because of our old economy industries. 1:03:23 Um, and that was intimately associated with China leveraging old economy type industries like manufacturing, uh, and real estate, uh, 1:03:37 to an infrastructure and everything that we know about China over the last quarter century to loom into view, you know, as a very strong number two superpower in the global system. 1:03:50 So unless you're prepared to think creatively about the opposite of what most people think is the main thing today, you can be woefully under-prepared for the long term. Yeah. 1:04:03 So do mining companies, big mining companies think about contingency plans around a Taiwan situation? Yes, all the time. Um- What would they do? What does mining, what do mining companies do? Yeah, yeah. 1:04:21 What would- Yeah, well- What would BHP, what would Rio, what would Fortescue do? Look, uh, I don't think I'll go into the specifics. 1:04:29 Um, but if you think about any kind of maritime bottleneck being closed, that creates a huge footprint for the maritime trade, and bulk commodities are a maritime business. 1:04:44 So first thing you think about there are your shipping routes. Uh, if, uh, if the Taiwan Strait is closed, what are my other options for, for getting to Japan, for getting to South Korea? 1:05:02 You know, that's really where you start thinking, but that's the tactical side of things. Um, then you have to start thinking about, okay, if there is a conflict somewhere, what's the duration of it? 1:05:21 What's the resolution of it? And are we dealing with an enemy or a rival when the smoke clears? And if you're just dealing with a rival again, then 1:05:38 you go back to this sort of edgy global commerce that we have now. Uh, but if you want to actually hyp- hypotheticate that it's a, um, you're in a situation where 1:05:57 countries choose just to not to trade to combatant... with combatants, and you have a full bipolarization of the world, well, that is a fascinating situation for individual commodity markets. 1:06:14 So if you're ever bored and have, uh, three months on your hands, take a look at all of the major commodity markets, assign the obvious countries in sort of to a US side versus an Eastern bloc side, 1:06:30 and then look at the swing states in the middle, and say, "Hmm, okay. What is the balance gonna be in the two blocs if that swing state does... 1:06:44 swings to one side or other or manages to keep trading with both sides because it's unaligned?" So let's think about an Indonesia, which is kind of unaligned, that sort of has a foot in both camps. 1:06:56 Um, it's possible in a, in a bifurcation scenario, Indonesia nickel finds its way everywhere.But what about uranium from Kazakhstan? Yeah. What about iron ore from Brazil? 1:07:13 You know, there's... 1:07:14 And so you sort of go through all of this, you come out with some fascinating permutations, and so you can actually think about the attractiveness of an individual commodity in that long catalog of things you're interested in, 1:07:28 can actually say, would this advantage this commodity produced in this jurisdiction under, under bifurcation where you can only trade with one half of it? 1:07:42 Am I going to the half of the world which is suddenly short of this commodity and therefore I get scarcity pricing? Or am I going to the half of the world where I have abundance of this commodity and I'm out of business? 1:07:58 So, so many directions that can go into, uh, and yeah. In, in terms of the things I worry about in warfare, uh, some of the things are, 1:08:17 they're not about kinetic conflict, hot conflict, if you will. Um, one of the things I've come across more recently is the idea of cognitive competition and how 1:08:34 AI engines could actually be used to weaken an adversary by kind of teaching their population not to think anymore, uh, and weakening their strategic capability and their decision-making ability 1:08:48 through cognitive tools, which is pretty scary. Uh, I'll be much more afraid of, uh, living in a society which had forgotten how to think, 1:09:00 uh, than in one which, uh, occasionally ends up in a skirmish, uh, over islands in any of our oceans. But, uh, the, the final point I'd make there, 1:09:14 um, if you like your dystopian novels, you know, the top two dystopian novels of the twentieth century, we all know them, Brave New World by Aldous Huxley, uh, nineteen eighty-four by George Orwell. 1:09:27 And someone summarized this very neatly the other day, and I, I apologize to the author of the blog because I forget their name, but they opened by saying, George Orwell was afraid of 1:09:41 society moving in the direction of burning books, and Aldous Huxley was afraid of a society moving to a point where they just didn't care about books anymore and stopped reading them. 1:09:54 And that's kind of the cognitive warfare angle, the last one. What if we become post-literate, uh, and our brains sort of, uh, degrade in terms of higher order function? That's a really scary thing. 1:10:12 It's a good paper from, uh, the chief scientist at NATO on this. That is, yeah, horrifying and fascinating to, to think about. In, 1:10:22 on the, on the George Orwell point as well, we're, we're in a moment as well where Animal Farm, his other famous book, is being reinterpreted as a, as a critique on capitalism and becoming a major Hollywood movie as well. 1:10:33 So there's lots of, uh, moving parts to this right now. 1:10:37 If we, if we pull it a bit closer to home, Hugh, and we talk a bit about Australia's role in everything we were just speaking about and, and public policy, one of the bigger decisions our government and various state governments made last year was to 1:10:52 bail out some of the, the smelters, various metals, various commodities, various companies as well. And right now this has a kind of defined-ish timeline on it, six months to, to three years in, in a few different cases. 1:11:08 I'm curious to hear whether you think this was a, a mistake and where this ends up going. Uh, well, 1:11:22 I think you have to deal with it on case-by-case basis, not saying we should never do this or we should always do this. Uh, my position on the aging downstream sector 1:11:41 is if we are to use taxpayer funds to, uh, keep that capacity in commission, there has to be a very, very specific conditionality placed on that. 1:12:02 That conditionality is that the government and the operator have a very open discussion about byproducts. 1:12:18 So I would say if you want to get your smelter, your refinery, um... Actually, I should say mostly refineries because you actually separate the byproducts at the refining stage. Um, if you want 1:12:35 public funds, you need to actually not just use that three years of, uh, OPEX and then just sort of say, "Oh, it actually is all too hard in three years' time." 1:12:48 You actually need to tell me what potential byproducts are in your waste stream which you're currently not collecting, what it would cost to build the processing circuits to go and get those byproducts, 1:13:02 and let's talk about that.So that's why I was, uh, in my own mind, I felt that the, um, the Port Pirie decision, uh, was actually quite defensible, 1:13:18 uh, because you've got some really important niche commodities potentially in that, uh, in that, uh, waste stream, which you can go and get. 1:13:29 And if you look at the strategic reserve that the Australians have recently announced, you've got antimony, uh, you've got gallium, and you've got rare earths. So antimony and gallium, of course, 1:13:48 they're byproducts from industrial metals processing, bigger markets, but the West hasn't actually made the same effort that the Chinese have to go after the byproduct systematically from the beginning. 1:14:05 One of the reasons for that is some of these niche markets are so small. If you bring on, bring on a new resource body of some scale in a, in zinc, for example, and you've got, um, 1:14:22 and that's got a lot of germanium in it, you might say, "Well, if I actually build the, um, the processing circuit to get the germanium out of my zinc concentrate, I'm gonna kill the germanium market in one go. 1:14:38 Because my zinc deposit's so big, uh, then I'm gonna kill the niche market." And so the economics of the byproduct don't add up. And that is why I think strategic reserve and stockpiling models 1:14:53 should be focused very narrowly. Not on big exchange traded markets with huge civilian divers- diversified end users in civilian activities like battery raw materials. 1:15:04 It's those niche metals with defense applications, high technology applications, where you don't need much at any given time, 1:15:14 but you won't have any if you just use the pure economics of what's the processing circuit gonna cost me, what's that gonna do to the market price of this very fragile balance which I have. 1:15:27 I actually think that is a place where a sensible approach to, uh, reserve stockpiling by sovereigns, fair pricing to remunerate long run marginal cost, so on and so forth. 1:15:43 I actually think that is a very good idea. Um, but if the operator is not prepared to have that conversation about byproducts, which may have some strategic heft to them, I wouldn't engage. 1:15:59 I've got, I've got like a, a thought on my mind, Hugh, while, while we're talking about the, the dynamics between Australia and China. Um, 1:16:11 the, the te- the tensions that are, uh, more, more, more pertinent between the US and, and, and China right now, but the, the ways that that kind of plays out for, for the miners. 1:16:22 And I, I'd just love to understand your synopsis of what's going on between the likes of the, the rise of C- CMIG, their influence and the, the, the pressure that the iron ore miners are, are feeling or what... 1:16:41 There's a reluctance to really put disclosure out there about it, and I, I kinda get that from just a negotiation strategy perspective. There's a downside from, from it. 1:16:49 But it kind-- it feels like, um, it feels like there's a lot more than, than meets the eye here. 1:16:55 It's, it's played out in Ji- Jimbaba fines first, and then there's, um, the, the, the kind of currency debate, the, the, the term contract dynamics. 1:17:05 How are you kind of interpreting the, this, this whole dynamic for the iron ore producers? Yeah. Like, first of all, um, I should state here that any comment I make is very much an outsider comment. 1:17:20 You know, I, I talk a lot to my former colleagues in the industry, but I wouldn't embarrass them by asking any direct questions about anything as sensitive as this. So anything I say is purely speculation on my behalf. 1:17:34 Um, look, I've given a lot of sort of background interviews on this over the last little while, but, uh, I've chosen not to, not to be formally quoted on any of this. 1:17:50 What's going on with CMIG and BHP? It could be, it could be nothing or it could be everything. That's sort of the range that we're talking about here. Um, 1:18:02 you open the conversation with RMB denomination and, uh, RMB's role in the world. 1:18:07 Well, first step towards that, making that happen would be to leverage the power that you have, uh, in certain markets to get them denominated in your own currency. Uh, and so I think it's entirely natural that, um, 1:18:27 an entity like CMIG would be pushing for CNY as the, uh, as the acronym that goes in front of the number. Uh, they would love to denominate, uh, iron ore in RMB. 1:18:41 On the ground, the reality is that, uh, at the Chinese port, a huge amount of, uh, iron ore changes hands in RMB already. 1:18:49 Uh, and RMB price signals through the Dalian Exchange and the port are already very influential in terms of setting, um, setting iron ore pricing globally. 1:19:02 What you don't have is the treasury departments of major resources companies running big RMB books.They also don't have costs of any huge, uh, amount in RMB either because the procurement organizations are, 1:19:21 are running their businesses in a different way, different vendors, US, Sweden, Japan, you know, Singapore, et cetera, et cetera. So this isn't a big spend on the RMB side. Um, 1:19:36 why is it playing out more obviously with BHP than the other majors? Uh, look, I think symbolically, uh, 1:19:45 Vale and Rio have sort of, uh, been the two largest producers over time, but BHP is the company that changed the pricing mechanism, uh, back in the day, and 1:19:59 you won't get anywhere in this industry unless you can change BHP's position on something. It did. It is sort of the, the leader in terms of how the market can operate. 1:20:10 Um, and in terms of sponsoring the PRAs, getting things like, um, transparent screen pricing moving. Um, 1:20:21 so that's probably why the effort would be directed more, uh, to BHP, but also why BHP is probably the toughest to negotiate with, uh, because the pricing mechanism, uh, 1:20:36 and that BHP pioneered and has since taken over the industry, has created tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars of value for iron ore exporters sending money to China. 1:20:52 And of course, that is a transfer from the Chinese. Uh, and 1:20:58 it's worth dying in a ditch over, uh, I think, from the, uh, Australian point of view, but also worth dying in a ditch over, uh, from the Chinese point of view, but neither side can, uh, live without the other for very long. 1:21:12 And, uh, that's, that's the reality of this trade. And I sort of use that concept in, in multiple conversations I have about, uh, these markets. Probably the most pertinent of them is the steel decarbonization. 1:21:30 Uh, lot of, uh, people have gone more quiet on that. You know, Trump has sort of created the post-shame society where, uh, uh, everyone who didn't like ESG before but was afraid to say so is now saying so. 1:21:47 Uh, didn't wanna decarbonize before but were afraid to say so, they're now saying so. Um, but yeah, there are two great realities of the steel-making value chain. It's the Pilbara on the one hand, 1:22:00 and it's China's blast furnaces on the other. And any future take you have on the steel value chain must take into account those two large and immovable objects. Uh, and, uh, 1:22:18 not even Simandu changes that. What a beautifully simple yet complex relationship to, to, to have and to, to fight over. Very curious to see how that plays out. Huw, as always, it's been fantastic to speak. 1:22:33 I think we could speak for many more hours about all of these topics. They're deeply fascinating to, to us, and hopefully the list- the listeners as well. 1:22:41 And you're gonna have a few more of these conversations coming up in, in, in a couple weeks with a, a conference you've put together. 1:22:46 So I think it's worth kind of sharing a, a couple of the details, 'cause some of the, the speakers- Yeah... you've got coming are, are pretty important to this conversation. Yeah. Look, absolutely. So, uh, 1:22:58 so my, my home base is the ANU in Canberra, Australian National University, and we're running a slightly different kind of critical minerals conference. 1:23:08 What we're trying to do is get all the different, uh, professions that, uh, touch on this industry together in one room, the different policymakers from different backgrounds in one room, different countries, to really look at the thing from all angles. 1:23:25 And, uh, February 19 and 20, I'm co-convening, uh, the geoeconomics, geopolitics, pricing mechanisms side of things, which I think will be fascinating. 1:23:40 And, uh, my co-conveners, one is a political scientist, one is a geologist, uh, 1:23:48 they will be bringing in Amanda Lacaze from, uh, Lynas, uh, Nev Power of, uh, Fortescue fame, uh, Grant Wilson, uh, of, uh, Taivan Limited. Um, and 1:24:08 it's going... I, I... We're gonna hopefully getting a lot of public officials there as well, uh, talking to them about stockpiling. Uh, [laughs] but yeah, so, um, it's called RECon, RECon+. 1:24:21 It grew out of a rare earth, uh, metals conference, but it's now broadening to all critical minerals. So R-double E-C-O-N plus at ANU. Uh, yeah, and it'd be great if we get some of your listeners along. Fantastic. 1:24:39 We, we highly recommend it. Huw, thank you so much for, for joining us and, and sharing your thoughts on this, uh, this amazing world we're, we're living in and these fascinating times. Yep. My pleasure. 1:24:50 Thank you so much, Huw. [whooshing sound] Here we go. Like you said, Trav, that just gives me a plethora of more topics to, to read up on, to, to learn about. 1:24:58 There's so much wisdom in there and so many fascinating subjects we, we kind of covered marginally there. There's a lot more to go into. 1:25:06 Last, last time I mentioned Taiwan on one of our podcasts, I think people were just commenting, "You're delusional, Travis," yada, yada. Anyway, I pose it as a hypothetical. 1:25:12 I just wanna know what happens in certain scenarios. I'm not saying anything will happen. I just... I'm curious. 1:25:17 These are big topics that they've gotta be thought about, and they have, like, geopolitical implications for commodity markets, of course, and the miners that operate within them who are trying to tread their way between these in, you know, enormous bifurcating superpowers of the world. 1:25:28 I couldn't agree more. Fascinating, fascinating topics. All thanks to our partners, we get to chat about this stuff, mate. Sandvik Ground Support. Focus, the platform by MarketTech. Intralinks. 1:25:39 And our partners at the beginning of this show, Exceed Capital. Go check them all out in the show notes. Hoo-de-roo. Hoo-de-roo. [whooshing sound] Now remember, I'm an idiot, JD's an idiot. 1:25:49 If you thought any of this was anything other than entertainment, you're an idiot, and you need to read our disclaimer. [upbeat music]